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Inaugurating 
the Second 
Reconstruction 
President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights 
Steven R. Goldzwig 
My dream is that ... America will come into the full light of the ~ay 
when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights 
and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity. 
-Woodrow W ilson 
I mmediately after World War II, the United States experienced a heady national ferment to extend the benefits of democracy to citizens both at home and abroad. Having fought for freedom 
abroad, Americans felt renewed vigilance regarding freedom at home. 
This was particularly true for the African American veterans. For the 
black soldiers who returned to the South, the signs of inequality 
and the continuing segregation were particularly galling, and their 
persistence was simply unfathomable. Even more ominous was the 
record of lynchings that continued to accrue. The vigilante violence 
tore at the American promise and made a mockery of American ideals 
everywhere. Freedom, equality, and justice might have been espoused 
for the many, but they often escaped the experience of the few. Thus, 
right after the war, minorities in the United States were particularly 
susceptible to the chasm between promise and performance, and they 
were hard pressed to articulate, much less experience, the tangible 
benefits of fighting a world war. 
The political climate was also changing. Establishing a vibrant 
peacetime economy was an enormous challenge. Pres. Harry S. Tru-
man was vexed by inflation and shortages of goods and services. The 
rocky road to conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy 
had spelled defeat for the Democrats in the off-year e lections and 
did not bode well for Truman's future political viability. 
For Harry Truman, the challenge was extraordinary. Absorbing 
all Americans into a prosperous postwar economy was a daunting 
task. It seemed particularly overwhelming when Truman turned his 
attention to the African American community, where the distorted 
face of ongoing violence, segregation, and discrimination was a daily 
image in the national mirror. 
In 1943, during the FDR administration, the riots in Detroit were 
ominous harbingers that not all was well with race relations in the 
United States. Truman searched for a way to redress ongoing prob-
lems. One of the most enduring actions the president would take in 
his attempt to alleviate continuing tensions and abuses in civil rights 
was to appoint the President's Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR). 
8 The PCCR came to represent an unprecedented move by the execu-
tive branch to analyze and redress racial intolerance in the UnHed 
States. Not since Reconstruction had the nation's attention been so 
focused on race and race relations. 
Truman's convocation of the PCCR was not primarily a political 
move aimed at winning the 1948 elec~ion (although politics was 
never out of the equation), as is sometimes argued, but rather was 
convened because of a compleX mix of motivations. Chief among 
those concerns wasp~ Truman's sense of justice, constitutional 
duty, and the emerging role of civil rights in Cold War diplomacy. By 
convening the PCCR, supporting and employing its recommenda-
tions in proposing ctvil rights legislation, and speaking publicly on 
behalf of a new civil rights agenda, Harry s. Truman distinguished 
himself as a proponent of human rights both domestically and inter-
nationally. In addition, the pCCR was particularly adept at fashioning 
a process and a product that served as a model for an effective attack 
on an intractable national problem. At Truman's behest, the PCCR 
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opened up a national dia logue on race that set a social, legal, and 
moral agenda for the next fifty years. 
Truman's Sense of Justice and Constitutional Duty 
On September 20, 1946, Harry Truman wrote Attorney General Tom 
Clark regarding Issac Woodard, a newly discharged African American 
veteran who had been blinded by an attack perpetrated by the local 
police. Truman wrote the following: "I have been very much alarmed 
at the increased racial feeling all over the country and I am wondering 
if it wouldn't be well to appoint a commission to analyze the situa-
tion and have a remedy to present to the next Congress-something 
similar to the Wickersham Commission on Prohibition. I know you 
have been looking into the Tennessee and Georgia lynchings, and 
also have been investigating the one in Louisiana, but I think it is 
going to take something more than the handling of each individual 
case after it happens-it is going to require some sort of policy to 
prevent such happenings."• Truman also sent a copy of this letter 
to minority affairs assistant David K Niles. His cover memo reads as 
follows: "I am very much in earnest on this thing and I'd like very 
much to have you push it with everything you have."2 
On December 5, 1946, President Truman issued executive order 
9808, which announced his appointment of the President's Commit-
tee on Civil Rights.3 In his informal remarks to the new committee 
on January 15, 194 7, Truman observed, "You have a vitally important 
job. We are none of us entirely familiar with just how far the Federal 
Government under the Constitution has a right to go in these civil 
rights matters. I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact. We have 
been trying to do this for 150 years. We are making progress, but 
we are not making progress fast enough." The president continued: 
"I am a believer in the sovereignty of the individual and the local 
governments. I don't think the Federal Government ought to be in 
a position to exercise dictatorial powers locally; but there are certain 
rights under the Constitution of the United States which I think the 
Federal Government has a right to protect. It's a big job. Go to it!"4 
The tasks Truman had set before the committee were vast and 
infinitely complex. The issues were multiple: a presumed need to 
reorganize the justice Department; development of codes for efficient 
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. .,. ... ... 
and effective criminal civil rights enforcement; antilynching legisla-
tion; poll-tax legislation; housing covenants; segregation in educa-
tion, housing, and health care; establishment of a permanent Fair 
Employment Practices Commission; minority rights of non-African 
Americans-the list went on and on. The president was demanding 
proposals that could be sent to Congress immediately. It was a tall 
order by any standard.5 
Committee members agreed that they would neither engage in 
public statements on controversial issues nor make public appear-
ances. This was in conformance with the president's wishes.<> Robert L. 
Carr, the executive secretary of the committee, repeatedly maintained 
that the report itself would be the closest the committee would get 
to reaJ "action" on civil rights matters. It was sometimes hard for the 
public and even the committee members to understand this point. 
The issues were so pressing and the pain so real that a blue-ribbon 
panel could seem nothing more than window dressing. Outsiders 
were worried that certain issues would be neglected. There was trepi-
dation that the president's committee would simply conduct busi-
ness as usual in an effort to fend off substantive progress. However, 
as William E. Juhnke observes, "While political considerations were 
certainly behind the PCCR project, there is no reason to believe that 
the creation of an advisory committee was a cynical political ma-
neuver designed primarily to delay or avoid action."7 The civil rights 
initiatives the committee drafted were always contemplated within a 
larger context that had come to include a fierce fight for moral and 
ideological s~rity in the newly developed but increasingly long 
tentacles ofL wa) diplomacy. 
Domestic Civil Rights and National Security 
As the United States continued to stake its position in the newly 
emerging postwar era, the cornerstone doctrines of th e Cold War 
were also in the making. Competition for the hearts and minds of the 
world community began in earnest. The United States was determined 
to cast international light on its newly defined role as a worldwide 
beacon of liberty. As a signatory to the newly formed Charter of the 
United Nations, the United States was hoping to attract more na-
tions to the democratic camp. The Soviets, in due course, became the 
chief rivals to the United States' vision, and the ideological warfare 
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soon became intense. Article 55 of the UN Charter committed the 
United States and other signatories to "the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples," and the United Nations as a body 
therein committed itself to higher standards of living; full employ-
ment; solutions to international economic, soda!, and health-related 
problems; and cultu ral and educational cooperation. Moreover, the 
signatories pledged "universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamenta l freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion."s 
1 ust as import ant, "l t] he postwar decolonization movement among 
Thiid World peoples put the question of race in an entirely new light, 
one that many traditional Americans found unsettling. Decoloniza-
tion efforts provided Afro-Americans with models of initiative that 
challenged existing racial assumptions and jeopardized long-standing 
racial arrangements that whites bad taken for granted."9 The global 
dimensions of the black civil rights movement had repercussions in 
America. 
But it was Harry Truman himself who best articulated the new na-
tional importance of dvil rights in his landmark address on june 29, 
1947, to the NAACP: "Our immediate task is to remove the last rem-
nants of the barriers which stand between millions of our dtizens 
and their birthright. There is no justifiable reason for discrimination 
because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or color." It was now time 
for the federal government to "show th.e way," and the president was 
emphatic in detailing the grave problem that domestic dvil rights 
abuses posed for foreign policy. It was necessary to best our enemies 
by a clear demonstration of our tommitment to freedom: "Our case 
for democracy should be as strong as we can make it. It should rest 
on practical evidence that we have been able to put our own house in 
order .... We can no longer afford a leisurely attack upon prejudice 
and discrimination." 10 /ke~ 
The need to "put oux own house in order" did not escape the at-
tention of the State Department. As a July, 1947, State Department 
memorandum suggests, 
By seizing upon and exaggerating in every way possible such 
defects as exist in the observance of human rights in the United 
States, the effort is made to destroy the idea of the United States 
as the land of freedom .... [Moreover,] [s]ince the moral posi-
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tion of the United States in the world is based o n respect for 
human rights, and since the continued existence of totalitarian 
regimes depends upon the suppression of human rights, this 
may be said to be the central issue of present-day world politics. 
The United States should not, therefore, take a passive attitude 
toward its problems in the field of civil liberties. Even without 
aggressive use, this issue forms perhaps the greatest natura l 
weapon in the contest and should be recognized and used 
wherever the opportunity avails. Similarly, the free institutions 
of the United States should be improved and strengthened in 
every way possible.'' 
With dvil rights abuses in the United States now characterized as 
the central issue in world politics, civil rights and Cold War diplomacy 
t were now inextricably intertwined, and their tangled relationship 
was increasingly looked upon as a serious matter. Thus the Cold War 
propaganda of the early postwar years recognized the pivotal role of 
civil rights in the United States as an important rhetorical platform 
in defining the struggle between East and West and between demo-
cratic and totalitarian states. The iconic role of the United States as a 
beacon of liberty was jeopardized by any report to the contrary, and 
it was the multiple contrary reports stemming from reported abuses 
in civil rights, especially those emanating from the South, that both 
fasctnated and soured the foreign presses from various world capitals. 
The United States was smarting under a tarnished image, and it was 
most desirous of immediate, long-term image repair. As Mary Dud-
ziak observes, "President Truman and his aides sought change in the 
domestic polides and practices that fueled international outrage."' 2 
Ironically, the negative foreign press helped the administration 
take spedal cognizance of the problem of 11freedom at home." At-
tending to civil rights at home for eyes abroad would soon become 
the "greatest natural weapon" in the U.S. propaganda arsenal. In 
short, the United States could not be the "leader of the free world" 
and fix its guiding star while simultaneously trampling the human 
rights of her own citizens. To the extent that this occurred, it was a 
blemish on the national reputationi at the time, this concern seemed 
to eclipse even matters of national conscience. By directing "moral 
action" in the civil rights arena as a necessary corollary to 11winning" 
the Cold War, the president, the committee, and the State Depart-
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ment fashioned an argument and forged a commitment that would 
have complex repercussions for decades to come.13 
"To Secure These Rights" 
In his introduction to the final report, Charles E. Wilson states that 
11 Civil rights is a national problem. The world is today confused by 
differing and often contradictory uses of the language in which free 
men express their ideals. It is our hope that our Report will help in 
the continuing rededication of our people to the historic principles 
which have made us great. We also hope that it will help other nations 
to judge our capacity for vigorous self-criticism and improvement 
through the normal processes of democracy." 14 
Ideological Rationale 
The request for action was premised on fundamental moral, eco-
nomic, and international convictions. Morally, the committee 
reasoned, "We need no further justification for a broad and imme-
diate program than the need to reaffirm our faith in the traditional 
American morality. The pervasive gap between our aims and what 
we actually do is creating a kind of moral dry rot which eats away at 
the emotional and rational bases of democratic beliefs." Economi-
cally, there was a need for "maximum production and continued 
prosperity." Indeed, "A sort of vicious circle is produced. Discrimi-
nation depresses the wages and income of minority groups. As a 
result, their purchasing power is curtailed and markets are reduced. 
Reduced markets result in reduced production. This cuts down em-
ployment, which of course means lower wages and still fewer job 
opportunities. Rising fear, prejudice, and insecurity aggravate the 
very discrimination in employment which sets the vicious circle in 
motion." The 11Separate-but-equal" policy is cited as a cause of lithe 
wasteful duplication of many facilities and services." Internationally, 
"domestic civil rights shortcomings" were perceived as an "obstacle" 
to "mak[ing] the United States an enormous, positive influence for 
peace and progress throughout the world." Moreover, the negative 
propaganda stemming from civil rights violations and abuses was a 
primary impetus to the committee's rationale for action: "We cannot 
escape the fact that our civil rights record has been an issue in world 
politics. The world's press and radio are full of it. The Committee 
Inaugurating the Second Reconstruction -... 89 
has seen a multitude of samples. We and our friends have been, and 
are, stressing our achievement. Those with competing philosophies 
have stressed-and are shamelessly distorting-our shortcomings. 
They have not only tried to create hostility toward us am on g specific 
nations, races and religious groups. They have tried to prove our 
democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a consistent o ppressor 
of underprivileged people. This may seem ludicrous to Americans, 
but it is sufficiently important to worry our friends." The ration a le 
concludes: "The United States is not so strong, the final triumph o f 
the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore wh a t the 
world thinks of us or our record." 15 With this rationale secure ly in 
place, the committee could advance its recommendations. 
Recommendations 
The final report submitted to the president recommends presidential, 
congressional, state, and educational remedies and action. Recom-
mended executive actions include enlargem ent of the civil rights 
section ef the Department of Justice, establishment of a special in-
vestigative unit in the FBI specifically for civil rights, establishment 
of a permanent commission on civil rights, review of the wartime 
evacuation of Japanese American ·citizens, administrative act ion 
to eliminate all vestiges of discrimlnation in the armed services, 
clarification of loyalty obligations of civil servants, issuance of a 
presidential mandate against discrimination in federal employment, 
Department of Justice court intervention on restrictive housing cov-
enants, and an executive order directing the Federal Bureau of the 
Budget to review all governmental programs for nondiscrimination 
policies and actions. This last point reflects the closely contested 
sanctions discussion in areas such as education. Twenty-one items 
were earmarked for congressional action. Among the most important 
were an increase in funding for the Justice Department's civil rights 
section; new legislation to supplement Sections S 1 and 52, which 
increased fines and penalties for civil rights violations, and Sections 
443 and 444, which covered involuntary servitude under Title 18 
of the United States Code; a call for an antilynching act; an end to 
poll taxes; legislation for ensuring voting rights; legislation on the 
aforementioned japanese American evacuees; local self-government 
for the District of Columbia; the elimination of segregated housing 
through restrictive covenants; modification of laws for naturalized 
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citizens; legislation to end segregation in the Panama Canal Zone; 
legislation to end discrimination in the military; sanctions on fed-
eral grant-in-aid programs for noncompliance with dvil rights law; 
a disclosure law covering all groups who sought to influence public 
opinion; and the enactment of a Fair Employment Practices Act. Rec-
ommendations for state action followed similar directives and were 
to be employed at the local level. Action on education included a call 
for a publlc-education campaign on dvil rights and one spedfically 
targeted at gov,ernmental employees and the military services.16 
President's Statement upon Receiving the Report 
Almost one month after the official due date, on October 29, 1947, 
the president received the commUtee's report. He said: 
I am going to read this report with great care and I recommend 
to all my countrymen that they do the same thing. I created 
this Committee witb a feeHng of urgency. No sooner were we 
finished with the war than radal and religious intolerance began 
to appear and threaten the very things we had just fought for. 
I notice that the title of this report ["To Secure These 
Rights"] is taken from the Declaration of Independence. I hope 
this Committee has given us as broad a document as that-an 
American charter of human freedom in our time. The need for 
such a charter was never greater than at this moment. Men of 
goodwill everywhere are striving, under great difficulties, to 
create a world-wide moral order, firmly established in the life 
of nations. For us, here in America, a new charter of human 
freedom wm be a guide for action; and in the eyes of the world, 
it will be a declaration of our renewed faith in the American 
goal-the integrity of the individual human being, sustained by 
the moral consensus of the whole nation, protected by a govern-
tpent based on equal freedom under just laws. The members of 
this Committee are busy men and women. We all owe them a 
debt of gratitude. I feel I am speaking for all Americans when 
I thank them for their unselfish, devoted serviceY 
Reaction to tlhe report was unavoidably mixed. In the North, there 
was positive acceptance; in the South, predictable angst and disgust. 
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Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold wrote to Robert L. 
Carr to laud the committee's accomplishment: " J think you h ave 
done much to educate the public, and it is, in large m easure, o nly 
by education, only by bringing about a deep-seated awareness of the 
problem, that we can make progress in this field. The contribution of 
the rep0rt to that progress seems to me to be as great as any which 
bas been made in our time."18 Truman historian and biogra pher 
Alonzo L. Hamby credits the president with spearheading a "bold 
and far-reaching document." Hamby asserts, "A half-century la ter, 
with those objectives all achieved, it is hard to conceive of jus t how 
path-breaking and controversial the report was." 19 
On to Civil Rights Legislation 
It had bec0me increasingly clear that a host of minority-associated, 
civil rights violations and concerns in the n ew postwar era includ-
ing lynching, violence, voting rights, and fair-employment practices 
was sl0wly filling the national cup to the point of overflow. The 
committee's report tends to magnify the problem in a particuJarly 
graphic way. 
Truman's sense of justice, his keen recognition of his constitutional 
duty as president, his political instincts stemming from the stunning 
1946 off-year election defeat of the Democrats, his anticipation of a 
tough, uphill battle for the 1948 campaign, and his desire to deflect 
international opprobrium by smoothing the pathways of democratic 
propaganda-all coalesced, if not conspired, to convince the presi-
dent that civil rights legislation was the only real cure. He knew he 
needed the South and was fearful of the breakup of the traditional 
Southern Democratic coalition. He knew the Dixiecrats might threaten 
to break away if he moved forward with his plans. Nevertheless, h e 
determined that he could not tum his back on civil rights; this was 
a significant, domestic national problem that, in the emerging Tru-
man-doctrine-inspired era, had come to be seen as an impediment 
t0 C<:>ld War diplomacy. A civil rights package was necessary to begin 
a dialogue that would help circumvent national chaos and preserve 
national security. Firm in the conviction that the selection of a morally 
righteous path in civil rights would ultimately help the United States 
prevail at home and abroad, the president seemed primed to trumpet 
his legislative g0al with an unprecedented rhetorical virtuosity. 
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State of the Union Address 
On january 6, 1948, Truman recorded the following in his diary: 
"Congress meets-Too bad too. They'll do nothing but wrangle, pull 
phony investigations and generally upset the affairs of the nation. 
I'm to address them soon. They won't like that address either."20 
Truman was referring to his january 7, 1948, State of the Union 
speech. In an election year, the State of the Union message always 
receives a bit more attention and perhaps more than the normal fair 
share of criticism. This election year was no different, except that 
the president's proposals seemed especially out of sync with the 
mood on Capitol Hill. Truman also used the occasion to announce 
his intentions for dvil rights: "The recent report of the President's 
Civil Rights Committee points the way to corrective action by the 
Federal Government and by state and Local governments. Because of 
the need for effective federal actions, I shall send a spedal message 
to Congress on this important subject."~1 
For Harry Truman, given his already precarious position in the 
public-opinion polls, the negative reaction to this address would 
be a clear warning of tough times ahead.22 If many people were 
unimpressed, if not offended, by the president's State of the Union 
address, they would be even more distressed by his upcoming speech 
to Congress on civil rights. Truman's administrative aides began to 
fashion this addr.ess approximately one week after the State of the 
Union message. 
Preparing the February 2, 1948, Civil Rights Speech 
Truman's speechwriter George Elsey asked Milton D. Stewart, chief 
researcher and writer on the report for the PCCR and an employee 
at the New School for Social Research in New York, and Robert L. 
Carr, the PCCR's executive director and professor at Dartmouth's 
Department of Government, for their comments as he contemplated 
the president's upcoming civil rights message. Since Stewart and 
Carr had been the primary writers on the president's report, there 
was great interest in their opinion about what the president should 
highlight. Stewart observed that a strategy should be drawn up that 
was cognizant of the following context: The Republicans, he argued, 
have taken up the "poll-tax, anti-lynching, FEPC [Fair Employment 
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Practices Commission] refrain." The "Wallace crowd is planning its 
major appeal to the urban low-income voter. It is common gossip 
here that they are sold on Walter White's view that the Negro vote 
will spell victory or defeat in the next election-for the President, at 
least." Stewart continued, "There is no doubt in my mind about the 
strength of the president's position with minority groups. His stand 
on the Palestine question until now, his NAACP speech, the work of 
the civil rights committee-all of these add up to a solid backlog of 
strength. But it must be finally secured." Stewart advised that what 
was needed was "a clear, penetrating image of the president himself 
as the unquestioned leader of the nation in the civil rights fie ld. This 
is an opportune moment to get it across. The essent ia l themes are: 
'Everybody else fumbles around; the President knows what to do'; 
'Everybody else talks and talks; the President acts.' Decisiveness and 
determination should keynote the speech. If these assumptions are 
true, then the speech should be pointed, straightforward and very 
brief." Stewart also advised the president to announce some presi-
dential action as "the clincher." His suggestions included ordering 
desegregation of the armed forces within a year, forming an FBI civil 
rights squad, ending segregation in the Panama Canal, or some other 
immediate executive action that would demonstrate presidential 
leadership. All of these recommendations were contained in some 
form in the PCCR's report. 23 
Carr responded as follows: "The President is confronted with 
something of a dilemma: it would be utterly unrealistic of him to 
recommend everything that is contained in the Report of the Civil 
Rights Committee; on the other hand, he must not disappoint those 
people who have had their hopes aroused by the Report. 1 think he 
can solve this dilemma by recommending a substantial, but mini-
mum, program for immediate action and then call for further study of 
many additional items." Carr added the following: "I think it would 
be good psychology to show awareness of the fact that all of our pres-
ent shortcomings are not due to the lack of legislation, and indicat-
ing that he proposes to take action himself immediately whenever 
that is within his power." Finally, Carr felt that the president should 
perhaps call for "a new statutory 'Bill of Rights"' or, failmg that, at 
least stir "popular imagination" by announcing a "unified program, 
as opposed to a series of unrelated and piecemeal enactments."z4 
In preparing for the address, some of the aaministration's advisers 
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were concerned that the president would be condemned not so much 
for what he said (although there was some fear there as well) as for 
what was left unsaid. Items that the committee ca lled for would look 
conspicuous in their absence from the president's speech. 
February 2, 1948, Address to a Joint Session 
of Congresson Civil Rights 
On February 2, 1948, Harry S. Truman made the following entry 
into his diary: , I sent the Congress a Civil Rights message. They 
no doubt will receive it as coldly as they did my State of the Union 
message. But it needs to be said."25 Indeed, President Truman had 
consciously and irretrievably delivered a strong civil rights message 
to friends and foes alike. Striking a , dignified and responsible" tone 
redolent of his historic NAACP speech, Truman invoked foundational 
principles he believed crucial to the American heritage.26 His litany 
included equality; equal justice under the law; equal opportunity 
for jobs, homes, health, and education; voice in government; and 
government protection of the rights of the citizenry. Such ideals, 
he argued, had inspired people to come from all over the world to 
escape tyranny and join in the blessings of democracy conferred by 
the United States. He told Congress, ,Unfortunately, there still are 
examples-flagrant examples-of discrimination which are utterly 
contrary to our ideals. Not all groups in our population are free from 
the fear of violence. Not all groups are free to live and work where 
they please or to improve their conditions of life by their own efforts. 
Not all groups enjoy the full privileges of citizenship and participation 
in the government under which they live." The president referred 
directly to the committee's findings, which had uncovered "a serious 
gap between our ideals and some of those practices. This gap must 
be closed." Truman argued assiduously that the protection of civil 
rights was a duty that obtains for every government "that derives 
its power from the consent of the people." Therefore, "[t]he Federal 
Government has a clear duty to see that Constitutional guarantees 
of individual liberties and of equal protection under the laws are not 
denied or abridged anywhere in our Union. That duty is shared by all 
three branches of the Government, but it can be fulfilled only if the 
Congress enacts modern, comprehensive civil rights laws, adequate 
to the needs of the day, and demonstrating our continuing faith in 
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the free way of life." Truman then introduced a ten-point legislative 
plan that included proposals for the following items: (1) a permanent 
commission on civil rights; (2) the strengthening of existing civil 
rights statutes; (3) antilynching legislation; (4) the stren gthening of 
voting rights by elimination of the poll tax; (S) establishment of a 
permanent FEPC; (6) prohibitions against discriminatio n in inter-
state-transportation fadlities; (7) home-rule suffrage for residents of 
Washington, D.C.; (8) statehood for Hawaii and Alaska; (9) equal 
opportunity for naturalized citizens; and (1 0) settlement of the 
evacuation claims of japanese Americans. 
Truman had made his list shorter than his committee's list, but 
this was a practical and a political necessity. The president framed 
his legislation as "a minimum program if the Federal Government 
is to fulfill its obligation of insuring the Constitutional guarantees 
of individual liberties and equal protection under the law." He also 
mentioned the executive actions he was undertaking that would put 
his own house in order by bringing consistency to nondiscrimination 
policy in the federal dvil service and the armed forces. 
Finally, Truman, true to earlier form, linked both his present legis-
lative proposals and his own ongoing efforts on behalf of civil rights 
through executive action to what he described as the unique "posi-
tion of the United States in the world today," which made adoption 
of these measures "especially urgent." It was important to build "a 
world family of nations," and he referred to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, which was at that very hour preparing an in terna-
tional bill of human rights. The president told the American people 
that the United States had played a leading role in that endeavor. 
"To be effective in these efforts," Truman argued, "we must protect 
our dvil rights so that ... we shall be a stronger nation-stFonger 
in our leadership, stronger in our moral position, stronger in the 
deeper satisfactions of a united citizenry." He concluded on a plain-
tive note, summoning the mantra of an increasingly familiar, new 
Cold War rationale for addressing civil rights: "If we wish to inspire 
the peoples 0f the world whose freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish 
to restore hope to those who have already lost their civil liberties, 
if we wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the 
remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy. We know 
the way. We need only the will."27 Truman's speech was audacious 
and unprecedented. Never before in the history of the United States 
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had any p~fdent d~vered a special message to Congress devoted 
entirely t~vil rights. 
While Truman set his compass on restoring the moral order in his 
defense of civil rights and his call for legislation, not everyone was 
pleased with his efforts. Some were puzzled, and others were openly 
disdainful. An editorial in The Christian Century offers the following 
assessment: "It is hard to know how to treat President Truman's 
message to Congress on the protection of civil rights. Considered 
simply as a presidential utterance, it is one of the finest in many 
years. The President nobly reaffums the principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence and the Constitution. In striking contrast to 
the usual drabness of his literary style, there are several passages in 
this document which student orators should be quoting for years to 
come. Most of the proposals, also, are just and progressive. However, 
it is unhappily probable that by lumping all ten together-making 
them, as it were, part of one package-the President has adopted a 
legislative strategy which will result in the defeat of all."28 
The South was threatened by the president's message as well as his 
civil rights package. In particular, there was fierce anger 0ver Truman's 
attempt to overturn the doctrine of white supremacy in the South 
by calling for equality in civil rights, jobs, and education. Whites in 
the South were reportedly "bitterly opposed" to the president's call 
for a Fair Employment Practices Commission. As Truman's blatant 
attempt to overturn segregation and undemtine discrimination was 
greeted with contempt, some even called for a Dixiecrat revolt. It 
was suggested that the Southern governors should mount a march 
on Washington. In addition, there was immediate talk of holding a 
separate convention to elect a Southern presidential candidate. 29 The 
president, however, had his defenders. For example, Walter White 
and PCCR member Channing Tobias were eloquent and forceful 
apologists for the president's cause.30 
The president had raised the ante on civil rights; this divisive issue 
posed personal political danger to him and threatened to widen as 
much as to narrow the social fissures. As Alonzo L. Hamby observes, 
"the political consequences of presidential support for civil rights 
were as likely to be negative as positive. In moving as he did Tru-
man followed his best instincts."31 Nonetheless, many at the time 
and since then felt those instincts were overly political and perhaps 
largely insincere. 
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Regardless of the debate over Truman's political motivatio n, the 
combination of the distribution of 11TO Secure These Rights" and 
the president's proposed legislation, while certainly controversial, 
led to a new dialogue on race in the United States. As David K. Niles 
reported to the president, 11Since the publication of the Committee's 
report, daily press coverage has never ceased entirely; but for eight 
consecutive days following the Message to Congress, the program 
was on the front page, top center, in news, features, editorials, and 
cartoons. The minority press has given the Message extens.ive, favor-
able coverage and comment ... . The program as a whole was hailed 
as the strongest civil rights program ever put forth by any President. 
The message was referred to as the greatest freedom document since 
the Emancipation Proclamation. The language of the message was 
descril:i>ed as 'Lincolnesque."' Niles reported that every major raclio 
network was developing some kind of program highlighting civil 
rights issues, that the Voice of America gave the message full cover-
age, and that a host of state and local activities were in the planning 
to solve the civil rights dilemma. One development that had not 
been anticipated by the president's committee was the evolution of 
municipalities that were beginning to conduct civil rights audits as a 
result of the president's counsel. A series of promotional advertising 
spots was also developed by the Advertising Council, which had as 
its theme "Group Prejudice Is a Postwar Menace." Finally, Niles told 
the president that more than 1 million people had already visited the 
Freedom Train, which celebrated the American heritage at a number 
of whistle-stops across the nation, and that 3-3.5 million people 
were expected to visit the train before its run was finished. Before the 
Freedom Train's arrival in each town, the municipality would hold 
a Rededication Week, which fostered support for national pride and 
the celebration of civil liberties. The educational mission that was 
presumed as primary by many of the architects of the president's 
program got a substantial boost from reports like the one Niles passed 
to the president. 32 
Truman's Commitment to Civil Rights: Doing What Is Right 
President Truman demonstrated presidential character and leader-
ship in commissioning the report, following it up with a direct call 
for congressional legislation, and continuing to press for his civil 
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rights program both substantively and symbolically throughout 
the 1948 campaign and beyond. In all three efforts he maintained 
consistency and steadfast resolve. AJthough some have questioned 
Harry Truman's commitment to civil rights legislation, I sub~ 
that his commitment to civil rights was sincere and unequivocal. 
While the arguments presented thus far give evidence for this point 
of view, I employ this final section of the chapter to reinforce a point 
1 believe has been a bit overlooked, that is, the intensity of Truman's 
resolve. Such intensity may be somewhat surprising coming from 
a man whose grandmother considered herself an unreconstructed 
Southerner, whose home state had deddedly Southern sympathies, 
and whose own language sometimes contained racist epithets. Harry 
Truman, like john F. Kennedy, who would follow him in the lineage 
of Democrats who occupied the Oval Office, grew on the job. Both 
his constitutional duty and his personal sense of justice seemed to 
be at play here. 
Before turning to the episodes that speak powerfully to Truman's 
resolve, however, I would like to point out that his sincerity in the 
area of civi l rights can also be deduced by an interesting chrono-
logical fact. On july 26, 1948, Truman issued executive orders 9980 
and 9981. The former prohibited discrimination in federal employ-
ment, and the latter called for the desegregation of the armed forces. 
These orders were signed immediately following the divisive 1948 
Democratic convention and slightly more than three months prior 
to the national election. This action led Ronald Sylvia to conclude 
that the president "reacted to events based on his personal belief in 
basic fairness and equality" rather than on political expediency.34 
Other significant episodes also reveal evidence of Truman's in-
tense feelings on civil rights. When an old friend wrote Truman to 
encourage him to "go slow" on civil rights, Truman replied, "I am 
going to send you a copy of the report of my Commission [sic] on 
Civil Rights and then if you still have that antebellum proslavery 
outlook, I'll be thoroughly disappointed in you." The president of-
fered a few personal examples to reinforce the kinds of injustice he 
fe lt his committee was trying to alleviate. The following example is 
representative: "On the Louisiana and Arkansas Railway when coal 
burning locomotives were used, the [N]egro firemen were the thing 
because it was a backbreaking job and a dirty one. As soon as they 
turned to oil as a fuel it became customary for people to take shots 
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at the [N]egro firemen and a number were murdered because it was 
thought that this was now a white-collar job and should go to a white 
m~. I can't approve of such goings on and I shall never approve it, 
as long as I am here, as I told you before. I am going to try to remedy 
it and if that ends up in my failure to be reelected, that failure w ill 
be in a good cause. "35 
Robert Ferrell notes that Truman piomised to mak e a public state-
ment on the abuse of civil rights in the South and that he kept his 
word by broaching the subject with an integrated audience in Dal-
las, Texas, at Rebel Stadium and by shaking hands with an African 
American woman in Waco, Texas, whereupon Truman was summarily 
booed for this gesture by the local citizenry. In arguing for equal rights 
in the South, Truman stepped forward boldly and courageously.36 This 
was an early precursor to Lyndon johnson's advice to John Kennedy 
to talk about civil rights to Southerners in their own territory, with 
the rationale that even if they did not agree with him, at least he 
could gamer their respect for a brave and forthright stand. 
Harry Truman's attempt to pass civil rights legislation was tem-
pered not only by Republican and conservative Democratic members 
of Congress but also by Truman's legitimate concerns regarding 
foreign policy and political timing. In April of 1949, Eben A. Ayers 
recorded the following in his diary: "At our staff meeting this morn-
ing Clark Clifford brought up the matter of civil rights legislation to 
be introduced to the Congress, particularly the timing. The president 
said that we could not let anything interfere with U.S. foreign policy 
now before Congress-the appropriation of the European Recovery 
Program, the Atlantic Pact or treaty, and the reciprocal trade agree-
ment legislation. If civil rights is introduced-and there are four 
separate measures contemplated-it will plunge the Congress into 
protracted debate and possible filibuster in the Senate by Southerners 
who may imperil foreign policy legislation. The president expressed 
the belief that [this was] about all that will be accomplished along 
the civil rights program this session, but that some of it will be lined 
up and some progress will be made."37 What some may have inter-
preted as a sure sign of "going slow" on civil rights may have been 
interpreted by others as an act of prudence at a critical juncture. At 
the least, a careful balance of foreign and domestic policy had to be 
entertained. 
h1 Jwne of 19SZ, toward the end of his presidency, Harry Tru-
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man delivered a commencement address at Howard University. He 
reflected on his civil rights initiatives: "Back in 1947, a good many 
people advised me not to raise this whole question of dvil rights. 
They said it would only make things worse. But you can't cure a moral 
problem, or a social problem, by ignoring it .... It is no service to the 
country to turn away from the hard problems-to ignore injustice 
and human suffering. It is simply not the American way of doing 
things. Of course, there are always a lot of people whose ·motto is 
'Don't rock the boat.' They are so afraid of rocking the boat, that they 
stop rowing. We can never get ahead that way .... lf something is 
wrong, the thing to do is to dig it out, find out why it is wrong, and 
take sensible steps to put it right. We are all Americans together, and 
we can solve our hard problems together, including the problem of 
race relations. "·111 
Truman's finely honed sense of right and wrong, his innate prag-~ 
matism, and his ability to rhetorically impart a prindpled vision of 6 
a just democratic society can certainly be adduced in these remarks. 
His resolve in the civil rights arena has had lasting implications. 
Conclusion 
Some people have argued that Harry S. Truman's dvil rights program 
was merely a ploy to win the 1948 election.39 Others have vigorously 
maintained that Truman truly felt his constitutional duty to protect 
and defend the rights of minority citizens.40 Still others have come to 
the conclusion that Truman had mixed personal and public motives 
in this area and that those motives might never be plumbed fully or 
satisfactorily. 41 I contend that Truman's intentions were dear from the 
outset and that he never wavered. Those motives were precipitated by 
his personal outrage at mob violence and his sense of constitutional 
duty. Those aims were instantiated in the committee's work, and they 
were productive of a most remarkable outcome. 
Certainly the pressures on Truman to turn his attention to dvil 
rights were many, and a number of them were political, including, 
but not limited to, restoration of a thriving postwar economy, the 
revamping of a sagging defense establishment, and restoration of 
military preparedness in a post-World War II, postdraft era; victory 
in the 1948 campaign; compliance with ongoing, international hu-
man-rights agreements such as the UN Charter; and an early Cold War 
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philosophy. These were perhaps best articulated in the emerging Tru-
man doctrine, which, not without some hubris, demanded that the 
United States-as the designated leader of the free world-undertake 
an unprecedented, global, democratic experiment, thus launching 
what would become known as the American Century. 
Perhaps the greatest, tangible civil rights achievement of the 
Truman administration can be found in President Truman's deseg-
regation of the armed forces.42 Clearly, Truman was unable to usher 
his civil rights legislation to fruition. 43 The president also weakened 
his case for civil rights with his government-imposed, civil-service 
loyalty program. Nonetheless, I maintain that we must not overlook 
the evidence presented here of Truman's own deep commitment to 
civil rights and the effectiveness of the PCCR report in sustaining 
that commitment. This certainly must temper our evaluations of 
Harry S. Truman. 
Whatever suspicions we rrtight have of the president's "true" mo-
tives, the evidence amassed here underscores Alonzo Hamby's modest 
claim that Truman's "civil rights program was a noble resolution of 
contradictory impulses," which certainly included a host of concerns, 
including those with personal, constitutional, political, economic, 
military, and international dimensions.44 David McCullough evalu-
atesHarryTruman'saccomplishments in civil rights with the follow-
ing observation: "He had achieved less in civil rights than he had 
hoped, but he had created the epoch-making Commission on Civil 
i Rights, ordered the desegregation of the armed services and Federal 
Civil Service, done more than any president since Lincoln to a waken 
the American conscience to the issues of civil rights. "45 
Truman's character and leadership set the standard and the tone 
for the PCCR. He was responsible for picking the membership, and 
he was responsible for their charge. He was responsible, then, for the 
committee's success or failure. Although he may have given short 
shrift to se>me of its ,recommendations and ignored others, I find the 
mere existence of the PCCR a most tangible achievement-one all the 
more remarkable for its scope and boldness in its time. Moreover, "To 
Secure These Rights" still stands as a major document in the annals 
of human rights. 1t was and remains a model of principle and action 
in public service, and it would later be emulated by Lyndon john-
son when he commissioned the Kerner Commission Report. 416 For it 
was Truman's cl.irect charge to his committee and the committee's 
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progressive, far-sighted response that became the impetus for the 
most indelible series of advances in human rights in the twentieth 
century. Long before Brown vs. Board of Education or the boycott in 
Montgomery and the modern inauguration of the dvil rights move-
ment in the United States represented by Martin Luther King Jr., the 
committee's work was a touchstone in setting off a climate for soda!, 
legal, and mora l revolution. 
In short, the committee's report set a tone and fostered a climate 
that spurred both words and deeds on race not heard since the 
nineteenth century. It spun a chrysalis of dialogue and action in 
the United States that not only made government and people vital 
but also engaged actors in a nationaJ effort to frame fuller, more 
humane lives. It was Harry Truman who reintroduced the nation to 
the problem of race, not merely as a divisive dvic problem fraught 
with tension, animosity, and political peril or as a vexing Cold War 
menace that had created propaganda disaster, but also (and, I believe, 
more importantly) as a test of high moral character-one that would 
ultimately define the American character. It was Harry Truman who 
invited both citizens and government to begin a long, arduous, but 
necessary process of educating each other and themselves about 
the stakes invo lved in difference, about the meaning of identity, 
about how to put a human face on an institution or a society-in 
short, about how to achieve equality and justice for all and redeem 
America's well- recognized but oft-broken promises. As a result of 
the Truman impetus, both proponents and opponents of civil rights 
engaged a national debate that continues today and is still shaping 
our tomorrows. 
Carl M. Brauer credits John F. Kennedy with seeking civil rights 
legislation that entreated both Congress and the nation to create what 
Brauer calls the Second Reconstruction, which he defines as "a coher-
ent effort by all three branches of the government to secure blacks 
their full rights."47 According to Brauer, this process began with the 
famous June 11, 1963, address. Kennedy did not introduce all of his 
legislative proposals on June 11, but he mentioned a few items as he 
carefully prepared the common ground on which all of his proposals 
would be based, and he promised he would send a message to Con-
gress the following week. However, I submit that Kennedy's premises 
in that address were the same as those of Truman's committee and, 
by proxy, of Truman as well. The ideals and the idealism expressed in 
Inaugurating the Second Reconstruction ---- I 03 
Kennedy's address had a prior establishment. Long before the inroads 
paved by john F. Kennedy and the legislation that Lyndon johnson 
would finally sign into Law, the key principles had been fashioned. 
The blueprint for action was already mightily forged. It was the PCCR 
that inaugurated the clear moral, economic, and international prin-
ciples that sustained the dialogue on and concern over improving 
the civil rights of minorities. Truman's efforts on civil rights not only 
placed emphasis on race relations in the United States but also firmly 
and irretrievably centered better relations as important domestic and 
international policy concerns. If, as Brauer argues, "Kennedy both 
encouraged and responded to black aspirations and led the nation 
into its Second Reconstruction," then it is surely President Truman's 
civil rights committee that was responsible for its inauguration.48 
In sum, Truman's charge and the PCCR's execution would refo-
cus the nation's attention on minority issues, force the majority to 
enlarge its vision, set the social and legislative agenda for the next 
half century, and ultimately, I believe, help inaugurate the celebrated 
"second reconstruction." We have Harry S. Truman's audacious 
leadership and steadfastness to thank for our national invitation to 
embark on that momentous journey. 
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